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Banking Reform in the Chinese Mirror1

Katharina Pistor2

Abstract:
This paper analyzes the transactions that led to the partial privatization of China’s three
largest banks in 2005–06. It suggests that these transactions were structured to allow for
inter-organizational learning under conditions of uncertainty. For the involved foreign
investors, participation in large financial intermediaries of central importance to the
Chinese economy gave them the opportunity to learn about financial governance in
China. For the Chinese banks partnering with more than one foreign investor, their
participation allowed them to benefit from the input by different players in the global
financial market place and to learn from the range of technical and governance expertise
offered. This model of bank reform contrasts with the privatization strategies pursued in
Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe throughout the 1990s. These different
experiences stand for alternative strategies of bank reform—One that relies on top down
changes of the rules of the game; another that focuses on inter-organizational learning via
observation. It suggests that the latter model may be superior under conditions of
uncertainty. The paper discusses the costs and benefits of these alternative models in the
context of the global financial crisis.

Key words: banking reform; financial crisis; sovereign wealth funds; China; emerging
markets
JEL classification: F36, G2, H8, K2, L22
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I. Introduction

Banking and financial sector reforms have proved themselves to be challenging
undertakings for domestic reformers and policy advisors around the world. Many reform
attempts have gone astray as the chosen strategies failed to take into account existing
institutions the newly privatized, merged, acquired, or re-capitalized banks would operate
under. Eastern Europe and Latin America are replete of cases where banks had to be
recapitalized more than once,3 or where bank privatization gave rise to government
bailouts or outright renationalization only to be followed by another round of
privatization.4
Against this background, China’s approach to banking reform stands out as
unique among emerging markets with a recent history of financial sector reform. Rather
than privatizing banks and transferring control to foreign investors—the dominant
strategy in Eastern Europe and most of Latin America—China sold minority stakes in its
largest banks to a group of selected foreign strategic investors.5 In each case at least two
foreign investors with different business profiles acquired substantial minority stakes
prior to the public offering and typically committed to buy additional shares in the public
sale. The government retained control and the remaining shares ended up in the hands of
a range of investors—including other publicly controlled entities, as well as individual
investors. Foreign financial intermediaries were sought as strategic partners for helping to
transform China’s banks and making them competitive both at home and abroad; this task
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On banking sector reforms in Eastern Europe (Rostowski 1995) and (Buch 1996)
This has been the case, for example, in Mexico. On the volatility of financial sectors in emerging markets,
see (Feldstein 2002) as well as (Ocampo 2001)
5
(Leigh and Podpiera 2006)
4

2
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1446930

became all the more urgent as China had committed to open its financial service sector by
the end of 2006.6
This paper analyzes how these transactions contributed to the reform of China’s
banking sector and facilitated the transformation of state-controlled bank behemoths used
primarily to channel financial resources to targeted economy sectors into viable financial
intermediaries capable of competing globally. It argues that the transactional model
chosen facilitated inter-organizational learning that has translated into tangible results in
at least two of the banks in question; the paper also notes that a series of transactions
between sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) from China, Singapore, and the Middle East
with Western banks since 2007 that have adopted notably similar transactional models.
The implications of these transactions call for a better understanding of alternative
transactional models and their implications for institutional change.
The paper is organized as follows: Part II describes the transactions that were
central to the partial privatization of China’s three large banks in 2005–06 and contrasts
this model with the privatization experience in Central and Eastern Europe; Part III
develops two qualitative models of banking reform—one based on the transfer of control,
the other based on learning by monitoring; Part IV applies the insights gained from these
models to transactions between sovereign wealth funds (SWF) and Western banks during
the global financial crisis; Part V concludes.
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II. China’s Bank Deals vs. Privatization Strategies

Like other socialist countries, China inherited a mono-bank system unsuited to the
tasks of transforming a centrally planned economy into one based increasingly on market
principles–even if under state guidance.7 As in other countries, China began the
transformation by breaking up the mono-bank and establishing several specialized banks:
The Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), and China
Construction Bank (CCB); The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was
added in 1985.8 Until the mid–1990s, China’s “Four Big Banks” operated under direct
guidance and control of the central government; their roles can be better describes as
resource allocators than financial intermediaries. Beginning in the mid–1990s, however,
China’s banks were pushed towards intermediation; they were instructed to operate as
commercial banks and become accountable for profits and losses they incurred.9 These
measures encouraged the banks to explore new market segments, including consumer
credit and lending to the non-state sector. However, they remained heavily exposed to the
state-owned enterprise sector, and as a result were saddled with substantial amounts of
non-performing loans (NPLs). Estimates on the ratio of NPL vary with different sources
putting it at between twenty-seven and forty-four percent in the year 2001.10 China
sought to tackle the NPL problem by creating several asset management companies
7

See (Nanto and Sinha 2002) for a summary of China’s banking reforms.
Note that a fifth bank, China Bank of Communication also received substantial foreign investment in
2005. HSBC acquired a 19.9 percent stake in the bank at the time.
9
Another way of putting this is to say that the budget constraint of these banks was hardened. See (Kornai,
Maskin, and Gerard 2003) for an overview of the soft budget constraint syndrome and (Berglof and Gerard
1998) for its application to the transition context.
10
See Nanto and Sinha (2002) supra note 6 at 479 quoting the Chinese government and Bank of China as
sources for these estimates. Note that the authors put the comparable ratio of NPLs in Asia prior to the East
Asian Financial crisis at 70 percent of Indonesia, 35 percent for Korea, 30 percent for Malaysia, and 50
percent for Thailand.
8

4

(AMCs) that bought NPLs from designated banks at a discount with the plan of
subsequently selling them on the market. Being unable to sell all assets on the
underdeveloped Chinese markets AMCs soon sought foreign investors. China Huorong
AMC—one of the four major AMCs that was matched with ICBC—managed to sell
large chunks of its portfolio of NPLs to an international consortium led by Morgan
Stanley and another chunk to Goldman Sachs.11
The purchase of non-performing assets from AMCs by Western banks can be
considered the first step in a series of transactions that created relational ties between
China and foreign financial intermediaries. The second step was the acquisition of
significant minority stakes by Western banks in three of China’s four big banks in 2005–
06.12 CCB, BOC and ICBC each negotiated a private placement of shares with strategic
foreign investors prior to offering their shares to the public and listing the companies on
the Hong Kong stock exchange.13 Table 1 below lists the financial intermediaries
involved and the stakes they acquired at the outset. It also indicates the size of the block
that remained in direct government ownership and the government controlled entity in
charge.

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

When these transactions initially took place, observers puzzled over the eagerness
of Western banks to invest billions of dollars in these large banks with a history of
11

Ibid. Note also that Goldman Sachs later became an investor in ICBC.
China’s Agricultural Bank (ABC) was slated for commercialization and subsequent (partial) privatization
only in the fall of 2008.
13
Bank of China launched an IPO of (domestic) A shares on the Shanghai stock exchange in 2006. CCB
was listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007.
12
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corruption, mismanagement, and continuing state control.14 The dominant explanation at
the time was that Western banks were trying to secure a foothold in the world’s fastest
growing market and were willing to pay a steep entry fee to this end;15 still, this does not
explain the motives on the Chinese side. A full account of these transactions needs to
rationalize the motives of both parties, i.e. foreign banks and China’s policy-makers. An
important motivation for China’s policy-makers may have been to secure the success of
the initial public offering by getting foreign investors to essentially back the offering
price. This explanation puts foreign financial intermediaries in the role of a stalking horse
for raising capital in the subsequent capital offering—a role they may have not been
willing to play without other rewards; indeed, other features of the transactions suggest
that this is unlikely to have been the exclusive motivation. Equally important for China’s
policy makers was to engage foreign institutional investors in reforming China’s banking
sector and to enhance its domestic and global competitiveness, without, however,
transferring full control rights to the foreign investor.
Several features of the deals speak in favor of a conscious strategy of engagement
without the transference control.16 First, foreign investors were offered a minority stake
that ruled out control, but exceeded that of a portfolio investor. With between five and
nine percent of total outstanding shares they had a fairly large exposure to the bank. That
reduced the likelihood of exit and increased the propensity of foreign investors to transfer
14

See Min Xu, Feeding frenzy for overseas banks, Asia Times Online Ltd, September 30th, 2005. Available
at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/GI30Cb03.html (last visited 23 May 2009).
15
David Barboza, “China bank becomes a giant worth $70 billion”, The International Herald Tribune, 28
October 2005.
16
For a summary of the transaction between Goldman Sachs and ICBIC, see Goldman’s 8-K filing No.
001014965 of 27 January 2006 available at www.sec.gov. The deal features between BofA and CCB are
contained in a news release of CCB “Bank of America to invest US$3billlion in and form strategic
partnership with China Construction Bank”, available at www.ccb.cn. For RBS investment in BOC see
RBS’ news release “RBS announces formation of strategic partnership with Bank of China”, 18 August
2005, available at http://rbs.client.shareholder.com/investor_relations/
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knowledge and expertise in order to enhance returns on their investment. Second, the
foreign minority investors agreed to lockup periods typically of three years during which
they could not sell their shares without consent of the company’s management and/or the
controlling owner—in other words, foreign investors were asked to tie themselves to
these investments for a limited period. Third, foreign banks were given an option to
increase their stake to a maximum of 19.9 percent after the lock-in period had expired,
allowing them to reap the benefits of their investments at a future date. Finally, investors
holding shares beyond a critical threshold (i.e. 2.5 percent) were given the option of
nominating directors to the board of directors of the bank they had invested in.
The model stands in stark contrast to the dominant transactional type that Western
banks used throughout the 1990s when acquiring financial institutions in emerging
markets around the world; in most cases, the Western banks acquired a majority stake,
and frequently bought out domestic banks completely. A typical example is Santander’s
acquisition of controlling stakes in countries throughout Latin America, or Citigroup’s
acquisition of the Mexican banking group Banamex in 2001, which turned Banamex into
a 100 percent owned subsidiary of Citigroup.17 Similar transactions occurred throughout
Latin America and Eastern Europe. As a result in many countries in these regions the
banking sector is now majority controlled by foreign banks: According to the Bank for
International Settlement (BIS), as of 2002 the share of total bank assets controlled by
foreign investors in Latin America ranges from 27 percent in Brazil to 82 percent in
Mexico. In Eastern Europe the range is between a “low” of 36 percent in Slovenia to 99

17

See (Guillén and Tschoegl 1999)for a detailed account of foreign banks in Latin America in the 1990s.
See also (Tschoegl 2002)
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percent in Estonia;18 the foreign banks that acquired domestic banks in Latin America
and Eastern Europe were predominantly from the United States and Western Europe.19
There are varying accounts of the success of this model, and final judgment will
probably have to await the fallout from the ongoing global financial crisis. Some studies
suggest that the profitability of banks under foreign ownership has increased, and that
foreign bank presence has had a positive impact on the real sector.20 Other studies point
out that foreign owned banks contribute little to financial market development in the host
country—instead they tend to lend to governments or entities that are too large to fail,
since they lack familiarity with local conditions to expand into more risky credit
markets.21 The global financial crisis has exposed yet another risk of this strategy, namely
the impact that the failure (or government bailout) of the foreign parent bank may have
on its subsidiaries in emerging markets, and—by implication—on the financial systems
and real economies in these countries.22 Such events can be particularly damaging in
countries whose banks have become part of an internal capital market of a foreign parent
bank; when this bank succumbs to a crisis, as a matter of due course it negatively affects
their subsidiaries.23
Against this background, China’s policy-makers have opted for a middle ground:
They encouraged foreign investment, but retained control and with it the ability to
monitor closely the engagement of foreign investors and the impact of their strategies on
18

See ((BIS) 2004) esp. Table 1 at p. 9 for details. Note that the share of foreign assets was only 9 percent
in Russia, which the BIS included in its category of “Eastern Europe”.
19
Ibid at p 5.
20
(Bruno and Hauswald 2008)
21
(Mian 2006)
22
This has prompted a joint effort by the EBRD and the World Bank to come to the rescue of the East
European financial sectors. See the “IFI Joint Action Plan in Support of Banking Systems and Lending to
the Real Economy in Central and Eastern Europe”, available at www.EBRD.com.
23
For empirical evidence on internal capital markets between parents and foreign subsidiaries, see (De
Haas and Van Lelyveld 2008)
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the banks in question and on their role in the domestic, as well as the global financial
market place. While China’s banks have not been immune to the crisis—and indeed—
some foreign banks have already sold their stakes in China’s banks—the decision to
engage more than one strategic investor has limited their dependence on a single investor.

III. Banking Reform: Assessing Alternative Strategies

Financial sector reform is primarily about institutional change, i.e. the reshaping
of sustained collective expectations of key actors in charge of decision-making inside
banks, and also of regulators and other policy-makers from the outsiders;24 yet, one of the
unresolved puzzles of institutional development is how institutional learning takes place
and how it might help a country to depart from existing institutional paths25 that have
failed to deliver economic growth and development; the subsequent section discusses two
approaches and offers evidence on how they have faired in the context of financial sector
reform: changing the rules top down, and inter-organizational learning by monitoring.26

Changing the Rules from the Top Down
One approach to institutional change is to change the rules of the game in a topdown fashion by transferring control rights to the new owners and by enacting new laws
and regulations. Transferring ownership from state to private hands is said to alter the

24

This definition of institutions builds on Aoki (Aoki 2001) and (Greif 2006).
On the path dependence of institutional development see in particular (North 1990)
26
The term “learning by monitoring” has been coined by (Sabel 1995)
25
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incentive structure by promoting more efficient use of assets.27 Moreover, a new owner
can bring much needed capital and expertise to a firm—or in this case—a bank. This was
the underlying philosophy of privatization policies in Latin America and Eastern Europe
in the 1990s which were aimed at promoting the restructuring of firms and transforming
the economies in which they operate;28 it is based on the assumption that a change in
control will alter the modus operandi at the bank and that new owners will take decisions
that will put a bank on a more efficient path. The model has dominated banking reforms
in Eastern Europe as well as in Latin America—where privatization and transferring
control to foreign banks became the primary policy strategy. As a result, foreign banks
now dominate these markets.29
The strong presence of foreign banks has undoubtedely had a positive impact on
the performance of individual banks, however, the impact on financial market
development—in particular on the broadening and deepening of financial markets in
these countries—is less certain.30 Available evidence suggests that in transition
economies their influence focused primarily on three market segments: foreign firms
from their home jurisdictions,31 consumer lending—especially mortgage lending,32 and

27

This is the conclusion drawn by property rights theories. Whether this insight translates to more complex
ownership relations in organizations has been questioned. See, for example, (Kornai 1990)
28
See (Cooter 1992) and (Worldbank 1996).
29
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
30
A recent paper suggests that foreign bank presence positively affects growth in the real sector. However,
the impact of foreign bank presence on financial market development depends on the relative level of
development of the country in question. Foreign banks are less important in the presence of well
established financial markets, but can help alleviate financial constraints in less developed ones. See
(Bruno and Hauswald 2008) for details. The study concludes that foreign bank ownership is only one
strategy for financial market development, and that efforts to foster domestic markets and appropriate
institutional reforms are also important. Ibid at 21.
31
According to a survey conducted by Berger et al., foreign investors in Eastern Europe continue to prefer
dealing with banks from their home jurisdictions when operating abroad, whereas they have switched to
domestic banks in other markets. See (Berger et al. 2003)
32
See (Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig 2009)

10

lending to the government.33 In contrast, foreign banks appear to have been less
important for lending to the enterprise sector, and to the extent they did, they focused
largely on large companies.34
One of the many lessons of the privatization policies of the 1990s has been that
privatization is not enough for transforming an economy; in addition to changing
ownership, the institutions that underpin a market economy must be developed—a
process that requires extensive legal and regulatory reforms.35 The transfer of ownership
was therefore complemented with an infusion of ‘best practice’ legislation and regulation
from countries with a demonstrably successful economic track record. These efforts
received a major boost with the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–98; many observers
attributed the crisis to defects in the institutions of the countries in question36—which in
turn let the IMF to launch a major new initiative to develop a sound “international
financial architecture.”37 Countries around the globe were assessed against a set of
indicators for sound rules on corporate governance, bankruptcy, the regulation of
securities as well as of financial intermediaries.

33

(De Haas, Ferreira, and Taci 2007) using survey data from 20 transition economies. (Haselmann, Pistor,
and Vig 2008) confirm the finding for consumer lending, but don’t find evidence on expansion of lending
to governments. Note, however, that they examined lending behavior as a function of changes in the legal
regime for creditor rights rather than overall lending patterns.
34
Note, however, that a recent study suggests that the presence of foreign banks in transition economies has
enhanced the prospects of SMEs to obtain external credit. See (Giannetti and Ongena 2009). However, this
may have been a temporary phenomenon attributable primarily to the easing of credit conditions that has
accompanied the recent global credit boom. On the rapid expansion of credit in transition economies, see
(Enoch 2007).
35
For an early exposition of this point see (Pistor 1995). The insight that law ‘matters’ has given rise to the
law and finance literature initiated by (La Porta et al. 1998).
36
See, for example, (Johnson et al. 2000). Critical, however, (Radelet and Sachs 1998) and (Shin and
Chang 2005)
37
See (IMF 2003)

11

The efficacy of this strategy was questioned even prior to the global financial
crisis that began in 200738 —the likes of which has shed further doubts on it. In this case,
the crisis erupted in those countries that had served at least as the implicit model for best
practice reforms over the past ten years—the United Kingdom and the United States.
Some of the business practices that have contributed to the crisis, such as an emphasis on
consumer lending and the extensive use of asset-backed securities,39 have indeed been
transferred to emerging markets—and may explain much of the increase in available
credit—at least in the short term. Improving legal institutions in the host countries
appears to have exacerbated this trend. There is substantial evidence, for example, that
improvements in collateral regimes such as the institutional reforms that have been high
on the agenda of the World Bank and the EBRD40 have enhanced foreign-bank lending
volume in transition economies, particularly in mortgage lending to individual
households.41 This would suggest that reliance on a singular best-practice model is an illfated strategy given that the sustainability of said model may not be known ex ante.
Moreover, the transference of standardized law and regulatory regimes cannot substitute
for the development of governance mechanisms for financial markets that are adapted to
local circumstances and thus sensitive and responsive to changes therein. Imported legal
standards may only uneasily fit into pre-existing institutions; in fact, many
complementary institutions that are easily available in the exporting country may be
absent in the country that imports ‘best practice’ standards from abroad;42 legal standards

38

See, for example, the self-critical review of the World Bank of its reform strategies throughout the 1990s
(Worldbank 2005). For a critical review, see (Rodrik 2006)
39
For a critical review of derivatives see (Partnoy and Skeel 2007)
40
(Summers 1997)
41
See Haselmann et al. and De Haas et al., supra note 28.
42
(Pistor 2002)

12

need to be adapted over time to respond to changing circumstances. As has been argued
elsewhere,43 law is inherently incomplete in that it is. unable to anticipate all future
events. Effective law therefore relies heavily on a proper allocation of lawmaking and
law-enforcement powers and their use by local agents. This suggests that legal and
regulatory reform can be only a partial solution to the problem of financial sector reform.
The key to developing successful reforms is to alter the collective expectations for
conducting financial and economic relations. While property and legal reforms may
signal that such a change is intended, the implementation of this formal, top-down change
requires a buy-in by key actors in the market—within organizations, as well as via law
enforcement agencies. Upon closer scrutiny, the top-down approach that was expected to
shift economies to a new mode of economic organization turns out to be a rather indirect
strategy to achieve institutional change, which ultimately depends on changing behavior
on the ground-level.

Learning by Inter-Organizational Monitoring
An alternative approach to institutional change is to encourage institutional
learning by actors in one economic system or organization from counterparts that may
exist elsewhere. This approach rests on a very different understanding of the processes of
institutional change than does the best-practice approach discussed above; it is actorbased, in the sense that it assumes that for institutional change to occur, actual change is
required in the practices of individual actors.44 This is based on the notion that behavioral
change is more likely to be achieved by engaging individual actors in the process of

43
44

(Pistor and Xu 2003)
See (Greif 2006) for a behavioral account of institutions.
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change rather than confronting them with new policy guidelines enshrined in formal law–
in the development of which they did not take part. Finally, it requires learning not only
on the part of the recipient of foreign capital and expertise, but also on the part of the
providers of these inputs.
The transactional model for the China bank deals creates incentives for
cooperation without sharing control: Foreign intermediaries were to transfer operational
and business skills while receiving an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the
operation of China’s financial markets and governance regime. The lock-in period
ensured that foreign investors would invest in this venture and not cash-in their capital
gains when the first opportunity arose; the option to increase their stakes at a future point
nonetheless allowed them to participate in the long-term returns of their investments.
Finally, the option to nominate non-executive directors—albeit falling short of giving
minority investors a strong “voice”45 —afforded them insights into the decision-making
processes at China’s state-controlled entities. This information is likely to have currency
beyond the deals at hand, especially for banks with plans of future expansions either with
or without government partners.
The task for policy-makers is also quite different in these two models: In the bestpractice model, their major task is to identify the most effective practices and to
encourage the drafting and passage of legislation that reflects these models. In the
learning-by-observation model, policy-makers set parameters for the transactions that
instill a process of inter-organizational learning; if properly structured, monitoring and
the lessons learned via these observations become integral parts of transaction

45

(Hirschman 1970) famously labeled the options of members in organizations as ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and
‘loyalty’.
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development which also serve to deliver economic benefits—positive returns on
investments. As Sabel has put it, “discrete transactions among independent actors become
continual, joint, formulations of common ends in which the participants’ identities are
reciprocally defining.”46 China’s approach to transforming the banking sector can be
viewed as an attempt to structure deals in order to encourage transactional learning via
monitoring. The channel through which learning by monitoring takes place is the
collaboration on specific projects inside the bank as well as board representation.
Some of the foreign banks that acquired minority stakes in China’s largest banks
have been deeply involved in their restructuring process; based on available evidence this
has been the case more so for BofA at CCB and RBS at BOC—and to a lesser extent for
Temasek at both CCB and BOC, than for others. This suggests that not every relation
created by the initial transactions has produced more than financial returns for their
investors, however, this data and its’ implications are important information, relevant to
the banks as well as for policy-makers as they select partners for future transactions.
The best source for the analysis of the nature and scope of collaboration that has
taken place are the annual reports of the three banks—all of which are publicly available.
While they give an incomplete picture—not to mention one written with the goal of
pleasing investors—they nonetheless contain important information. In its’ 2007 Report,
CCB acknowledges the contributions of Band of America for the improvements in
customer services: “In 2007, the Bank [CCB] rolled out retail branch transformation, one
of the major strategic collaboration projects with BofA, across the Bank…” According to
the report, 5,266 branches, or 39.16 percent of all branches, underwent transformation

46

See Sabel supra note 35 at 138.
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over the course of the year with positive impacts on sales volumes and work efficiency.47
In addition, both BofA and Temasek were involved in developing different business areas
for CCB. CCB and BofA established 32 “experience sharing projects”, including a “voice
of the customer project” that which was used in the transformation of bank branches.
Temasek, the Singaporean sovereign wealth fund that acquired a 5 percent stake,
provided training in small and medium-sized enterprise financial services and wealth
management.48 The collaboration with Bank of America in particular has gone well
beyond consultancy and assistance with CCB’s mainland transactions. BofA merged its
former subsidiary, BofA Asia in Hong Kong with CCB—thereby consolidating the
banking operations of the two banks in Asia. Moreover, CCB and BofA jointly
established CCB Financial Leasing—China’s largest financial leasing company to date.49
BOC’s annual report for 2007 includes a separate section devoted to “cooperation
with strategic investors”.50 The report highlights the cooperation between BOC and RBS
in areas including “corporate banking, personal banking, financial market business, risk
management and internal control, treasury and capital management, as well as human
resource management.”51 Sixty of RBS senior managers worked with BOC’s staff on
these projects. Conversely, BOC seconded a senior manager to Citizens Bank in the US,
a subsidiary of RBS, to observe banking operations there. The other two strategic
investors, UBS and Temasek are less prominently featured in the report, although it

47

See CCB’s annual report for 2007 available at www.ccb.com (under investor relations) at 16.
Ibid at 17.
49
Ibid, 59-60.
50
See BOC’s annual report for 2007, available on BOC’s webpage at
http://www.boc.cn/en/static/investor.html at 96-98.
51
Ibid at 96.
48
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mentions the establishment of a joint steering committee with UBS and Temasek’s
technical support for small- and medium-size business finance.52
ICBC’s annual report for 2007 contains information about the role of its major
foreign strategic investors—Goldman Sachs, Allianz, and American Express.53 It
suggests that Goldman was involved in investor relations, control compliance and risk
management, as well as treasury operations. In particular, Goldman Sachs is said to have
“actively cooperated on the research and development of RMB interest rate derivative
products, currency options products and foreign exchange structured products.”54
Moreover, ICBC and the German-owned insurance company Allianz cooperated on
insurance business; they formed a joint venture (Allianz China) and Allianz assisted
ICBC in developing sales concepts, and marketing networks. Finally, the strategic
alliance with American Express materialized in the launching of several new credit cards
in China.55
All three banks received non-executive directors on their boards who concurrently
occupied important positions at their parent organizations. BofA’s vice chairman of
corporate development—Gregory Curl—served on the board of CCB. The Group Chief
Executive of RBS—Fred Goodwin—served on the board of BOC, and so did Lim Huat
Peter Seah, who has also been a member of Temasek’s advisory panel; finally,
Christopher Cole—chairman of the investment banking division at Goldman Sachs, and
John L. Thornton—a former president and director of Goldman Sachs, served on the
board of ICBC. Board seats occupied by minority shareholders may be less important for
52

Ibid.
See ICBC’s annual report for 2007, available at http://www.icbcltd.com/icbcltd/investor%20relations/download%20center/
54
Ibid at 92.
55
Ibid.
53
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the ‘voice’ they confer as opposed to the insights they offer about governance practices at
the company they invest in. Given the dominant role played by government-controlled
entities as major shareholders of these banks, they are likely to offer foreign investors
clues not only about organizational governance, but also about the objectives for the
governance of financial markets pursued by the Chinese authorities.
In sum, the foreign strategic investors in China’s three banks have been involved
in developing areas of financial services in which they have a comparative advantage.
China’s banks have been able to learn what were deemed some of the most important
players in their respective field of expertise and to transpose what they have learned into
the realities of China’s financial market. Not all collaborations have been equally
successful, however, this does not defeat the strategy; on the contrary, engaging more
than one strategic investor per bank helps diversify the risk associated with over-reliance
on a single financial strategy that might turn out to be ill-suited or simply flawed, and
also serve to stand against the risk of contagion of problems associated with the investor
or its home market.
Learning by monitoring can also take the form of comparative monitoring via a
central agent. By virtue of the fact that the government indirectly controls the Chinese
intermediaries involved in these transactions, Chinese authorities are in a position to
compare the experiments these banks undertook. This puts them in a position to monitor
the evolution of the relations and to assess their respective impact on domestic and global
financial markets. This strategy of facilitating decentralized experimentation, monitoring
the process of experimentation and its’ outcomes, and ultimately choosing from among
these outcomes for a wider application of those with the most promising track record has

18

been used extensively throughout China’s economic reform process; the experiment with
township village enterprises—which took different forms in different parts of the
country—is a prominent example.56 Some observers have attributed China’s success in
economic reforms generally to the organization of decision-making processes, which
have encouraged decentralized experimentation and innovation under conditions of
uncertainty; as Qian et al. (2006) explain, different organizational forms determine the
success of innovation strategies. If the probability of success is high either because the
strategy is well-tested or simply sufficient for the generation of sound predictions about
outcomes, a centralized, top-down reform strategy employing a “U-Form” is more
effective. Contrastingly, under conditions of uncertainty an organizational approach more
akin to an “M-Form” that encourages decentralized experiments is more likely to reap
success over time.57
Financial sector reform—especially in the formerly socialist world—is a complex
undertaking with a low probability of success for any given strategy. The top-down
approach employed in Central and Eastern European markets as well as in Latin
American markets assumes the opposite. Based on the assumption that ‘best practice’ is
knowable and universal, it prescribes a single model for organizing and governing
financial markets. The application of this model to the real world has demonstrated not
only that the same model may not work everywhere. The global financial crisis has also
shed doubts on the merits of that model itself. Moreover, foreign bank dominance has left
many banks in Eastern Europe and Latin America exposed to the success and failure of
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(Qian, Roland, and Xu 2006)
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the banks’ parents whose conduct and business strategies they could neither monitor nor
influence (Pistor 2009).
To be sure, the China-bank deals were also affected by the crisis. Several Western
banks sold part or all of the shares they had acquired in Chinese banks upon the
expiration of the lockup periods they had initially agreed to. This occurred primarily in
the context of recapitalization efforts by these banks. Thus, RBS and UBS—two banks
that had to be rescued by their home governments in the fall of 2008—sold their stake in
the Bank of China in early January 2009. Bank of America first increased its stake in
China Construction Bank, taking advantage of an option to increase its shares to 19.9
percent at the end of the initial three-year investment period, and subsequently the bank
sold the nine percent stake it had originally acquired in 2005 in response to pressure by
the United States government to shore up its capital base.58 Finally, Goldman Sachs,
Allianz, and American Express reduced their holdings in ICBC upon the expiration of
their lockup period.59 However, as suggested earlier, not all foreign investors were of
equal value for Chinese banks in terms of promoting their transformation into major
financial intermediaries. Thus, retaining BofA as an investor of CCB may have been
more important than keeping UBS at BoC. Nonetheless, the fire-sale by stricken investors
was not part of the initial design of these transactions; in fact, the Chinese government
recently announced that future investors in Chinese banks would have to agree to a four
rather than a three-year lockup period;60 this supports the notion that stability of bank
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holdings is high on the agenda of China’s policy-makers. As it turns out, the engagement
of more than one foreign investor in China’s bank at the time of privatization contributed
to the pursuit of that goal; for example, Temasek—one of Singapore’s two sovereign
wealth funds, invested in CCB and BOC at the same time Western banks did. Not only
did Temasek stay put as Western banks pulled out, it also acquired some of the shares
these withdrawing banks sold. Temasek also participated in a consortium that bought
CCB shares BofA sold in April 2009 and acquired a stake in ICBC by buying up shares
Goldman Sachs and others sold in ICBC in April 2009;61 moreover, they committed not
to sell their stake in BoC at the moment—the vice- president of BoC even made a public
statement that Temasek had a ‘moral obligation’ to contribute to market stability.62
Whether the reasons for this ‘moral obligation’ lies in Temasek’s role as a foreign
investor in all three banks, or whether it lies in the fact that as a sovereign wealth fund it
is expected to share China’s concern for the stability of financial markets more so than its
private counterparts is unclear. In any event, this episode should have re-enforced the
notion that foreign investors do indeed come in different types and that they behave
accordingly. By ensuring that each bank had at least two strategic investors the risk
associated with each one of them was mitigated.

IV. Bank Deals in the Global Crisis

Learning by inter-organizational monitoring is a strategy not limited to the
aforementioned bank-deals in China. In fact, it is a strategy frequently employed under
61
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conditions of uncertainty; examples include collaborations among firms in high tech
sectors where highly open-ended collaborative forms of contract are increasingly
common.63 The same collaborative infrastructure applies to the area of finance, as is
demonstrated by a series of recent transactions Western banks and sovereign wealth
funds (SWFs). In 2005-06, Western banks queued for acquiring minority stakes in
China’s state-controlled banks. Only two years later, Western banks found themselves
queuing in China, Singapore, Kuwait and Qatar to sell stakes in their banks to sovereign
wealth funds (SWFs)64 from these countries; the model used in the SWF transactions is
strikingly similar to the transactional model of the China bank deals described above to a
point of mirroring actors’ roles; they often involved minority stakes with two or more
SWFs, lockup periods or arrangements with similar effects–such as the use of convertible
instruments and optional board seats for investors, while not offering any executive
positions or control rights. Table 2 presents data on Western banks that have received
capital injections from SWFs and/or other foreign individuals or entities.

INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

One of the most striking features of these transactions is their durability. As
discussed above, a number of Western banks sold their stakes in Chinese banks when
they needed to raise capital. In contrast, hardly any of the SWFs have dumped their stock
holdings in Western banks; in fact, many have deepened their ties despite of the financial
63

(Gilson, Sabel, and Scott 2009)
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losses they suffered. This is true for QIA’s investments in Barclays, GIC’s investments in
Citigroup, as well as CIC’s investments in Blackstone and Morgan Stanley which will be
discussed further below. One partial exception is Temasek’s sale of the stake in BofA,
however, Temasek only became a shareholder of BofA as a result of that bank’s merger
with Merrill Lynch—in which Temasek had invested earlier. Temasek also divested from
Barclays in June 2009 amidst a reorientation of its investment strategy from developed to
emerging markets.
Since the focus of this paper is the governance of financial relations in China, the
following analysis focuses on the transactions that involved Chinese entities as investors
in Western financial intermediaries. Consider first the transaction between Blackstone
and China Investment Corporation (CIC) of May 2007. Blackstone is a United Statesbased asset manager with global span; until May 2007, it operated as a series of general
partnerships, all separately owned by various Blackstone partners and all sharing the
same “family” name. At the time of its reorganization the total assets under management
were valued at US $88 billion.65 In May 2007 Blackstone was reorganized into a limited
partnership structure so that the company could raise capital from outside investors
without sharing control. Prior to Blackstone’s public offering, 101,334,234 non-voting
common units were sold at a discount of 5 percent to “an investment vehicle established
by the People’s Republic of China with respect to its foreign exchange reserves”66 which
later became a wholly owned subsidiary of CIC. This deal made CIC—China’s newly
formed sovereign wealth fund that manages US$200 billion67—the largest single investor
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in the newly-formed Blackstone Holding. While the limited partnership structure
Blackstone chose for its reorganization did not grant voting rights to unit holders, an
investor with such a large stake and—more importantly—additional available assets for
future investments is likely to be heard by any management irrespective of formal voting
rights.
The detailed features of the CIC-Blackstone deal are consistent in their
similarities with those of the China-Bank deals discussed above. Future investments by
CIC in Blackstone were restricted in the original agreement so that at no time would it
own more than 10 percent equity in Blackstone Group Limited Partnership.68 CIC
committed not to sell its units for a period of four years save for the event of a change of
control at Blackstone; in the event that CIC decided to sell at the end of the lockup
period, it was agreed that they would not to sell more than one-third of its units in next
three consecutive years. Finally, in one of the clearest indications that the quid pro quo of
the transaction went beyond the exchange of units for money, CIC “agree(d) to explore in
good faith potential arrangements pursuant to which it or its affiliates would invest in or
commit fund amounts to current and future investment funds managed by [Blackstone]
and to evaluate in good faith and consider investing in any comparable funds or vehicles
offered by [Blackstone] in connection with any investment they make in alternative funds
or vehicles.”69 The provision could be interpreted as a commitment device for
Blackstone: Only if the deal turned out to be lucrative for CIC would they explore future
business opportunities in ‘good faith;’ CIC lost heavily on this transaction and has been
severely criticized in China for it, yet, because of the lockup provision, CIC is unable to
68
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walk away from the deal. In fact, CIC is unlikely to do so as the benefits of partnering
with Blackstone for future investment strategies may well pay off not only in the US, but
globally.70
Within six months of the Blackstone transaction, CIC made another important
acquisition. In December of 2007, CIC acquired a 9 percent stake in the US investment
bank Morgan Stanley; this time the investment took the form of convertible debt
securities at a fixed interest rate of 9 percent. The change in deal structure developed as a
response to the deepening global financial crisis and to the losses CIC had suffered in
Blackstone—reflecting a greater awareness of the risks of investing in financial
intermediaries at the time. Even so, the revised structure of the deal had a familiar
feature: CIC committed to a long-term engagement in Morgan Stanley. An early exit is
unlikely—not because of an explicit lockup provision—but because of the structure of
the deal. The use of convertible-debt instruments binds the investor de facto until the
conversion date, and likely beyond that date to a point in time when the conversion will
generate a positive return. CIC’s choice to invest in Morgan Stanley rather than in
Citibank, Merrill Lynch, or other Western banks reflects a preference for long-term
partnerships with foreign investors, as Morgan Stanley’s foray into China’s financial
system dates back to the mid 1990s; as noted above, Morgan Stanley headed a
consortium that acquired NPL from one of the major AMCs, which had been established
to shore up the balance sheets of China’s largest banks. In 1995, Morgan Stanley also
helped to establish the China International Capital Corporation—China’s first
international brokerage. Its joint venture partner at the time was China Construction Bank
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(CCB), although CCB’s shares in CICC were subsequently transferred to CIC. Finally,
Morgan Stanley acted as CCB’s advisor on its IPO in 2005. CIC’s investment in Morgan
Stanley is a logical extension of this set of relations at a time when Morgan Stanley was
in need of capital support; this gave CIC direct access to information on the detailed
transactional operations of an internationally-active investment bank. In fact, CIC asked
Morgan Stanley in the spring of 2008 to develop an asset management plan for CIC’s
international investments.71 CIC also stood ready to invest in Morgan Stanley in
September 2008 when the investment bank faced collapse in the wake of the Lehmann
Brothers bankruptcy, thus signaling CIC’s willingness to acquire another 40 percent in
MS; however, the CIC stepped aside when Mitsubishi UFJ of Japan offered a higher
price for a 20 percent stake. CIC renewed its commitment to MS once more when it
acquired additional shares in June of 2009, at a time when MS was trying to meet capital
requirements that would allow it to reimburse the US government money lent as part of
the TARP program in October 2008.72 Despite the fact that CIC’s investments in both
entities lost substantial in value during the crisis and have not recovered since, the
relationships established via these investments appear to have paid off: CIC announced in
July 2009 that it had selected Blackstone and Morgan Stanley to oversee hundreds of
millions of dollars in asset allocations and asset management.73
The deal between China Development Bank (CDB) and Barclays differs from the
other two transactions in that CDB appears only as a junior partner to Temasek, one of
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Singapore’s two SWFs. CDB was established as a policy bank and was only transformed
into a commercial bank in late 2008;74 at the time it invested in Barclays it had virtually
no foreign experience. Co-investing with Temasek allowed CDB to learn first hand from
one of the most successful SWFs in East Asia–one that in similarity to CDB had a history
resembling that of a domestic development bank. Contrastingly, most SWFs operate as
investment management firms. Temasek has become known for its role as a value
investor, taking fairly large stakes in companies in critical sectors of the economy and
selling them at a future date for profit.75 Over time, Temasek’s focus has shifted from
heavy industry to telecommunications, from domestic to international investments, and
finally to finance.76 In the Barclays deal, the two Asian financial intermediaries provided
the UK bank with liquidity at the time Barclays was battling a competing bid for a merger
with ABN-AMRO. Barclays eventually lost despite the capital injection,77 however,
Singapore and CDB stayed on as shareholders despite the absence of any lock-in
provisions; they subsequently participated in another public offering by Barclays in June
of 2008, helping to boost the bank’s capital base during the deepening financial crisis
when private investors shied away from financial intermediaries. They also supported
Barclays’ private placement of securities with an investment consortium led by Qatar in
November of 2008 as a means to fend off UK government ownership in the bank.78
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In sum, just as in the cases of the China bank deals, the SWF transactions were
structured to create commitments for the parties involved beyond the quid pro quo of a
standard portfolio transaction. This does not mean that CIC, CDB, or Temasek were
uninterested in harnessing returns on their investments, however, the financial loss may
have been compensated at least in part by opportunities to learn about how their targets or
co-investors operate. The fact that CIC chose its two primary investment targets to help
this SWF to allocated its investments in US and global markets is a clear indicator that
the investment in learning by monitoring has paid off for all parties.

IV. Concluding Comments

China has established an approach to banking or—more broadly—financial sector
reform that differs markedly from those utilized in other emerging market economies. At
the core of this approach has been the creation of equity ties between large Chinese banks
and two or more strategic investors from different governance regimes. Instead of
transferring control, these transactions enabled cooperation and inter-organizational
learning. The approach for financial sector reform reflects a broader trend in China’s
economic reform strategy—one that emphasizes the continuous process of economic
transformation and the need for the continuous adaptation and experimentation of
institutional arrangements under conditions of uncertainty.
The transactions between Western banks and SWFs from China, Singapore and
the Middle East which concluded during the global financial crisis bear striking

November 2008, available at www.investorrelations.barclays.co.uk. For a detailed discussion of this
transaction see also (Pistor 2009).
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similarities with those earlier transactions; just as in China’s bank deals, investors
acquired only minority stakes–not control rights. In most cases, more than one investor
was involved and most agreed to lockup periods, or the transactions were structured so as
to make an early exit difficult; an important motive for these deal structures was to
stabilize ownership patterns as a means for reducing share price volatility on one hand,
and the ability to learn from monitoring and cooperating with other parties. This deal
structure marks a departure from patterns of foreign investments that assume superior
expertise by one party and that uses control rights as a surety for transferring such
expertise.
The global financial crisis has cut short some of these relations–most notably in
the case of RBS and the BoC. It has also subjected the transactional models discussed to
a stress test, which revealed that minority owners, and especially Western banks—even
those holding a fairly large stake—might not be the stable owners they were expected to
be; so long as the cost of exit is not prohibitively high, they will exit when it suits their
needs. The best insurance against the downward pressure such an exit may exert on share
prices and—by implication—on the stability of domestic banks has been the presence of
another strategic investor willing and able to step into the void; in the examples
discussed, SWFs have proven more reliable stabilizers than private investors;79 this
suggests that the identity of the owners may be as important as the structure of the deal–it
remains to be seen whether SWFs’ willingness to endure financial loss in the interim will
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pay off in the long-term. One thing seems sure: for recipients of foreign investments,
limiting the stakes of individual foreign investors and diversifying among them may limit
the fallout from crises that originate in the parent company or its’ home country;80
moreover, it offers recipients of investments an opportunity to diversify among different
business models and financial strategies, thus increasing the payoff from interorganizational learning.
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Table 1: Foreign Investors & China’s Largest Banks
Bank
Foreign Investor

Stake

Other Blockholders

Stake

Bank of China

Royal Bank of Scotland

8.25

Hui Jin

59.12

UBS

1.33

Jianyin (WOS of Hui
Jin)

8.85

Temasek (Fullerton Fin)

4.13

Bank of America

8.19

Hui Jin

67.49

Temasek (Fullerton Fin.)
Goldman Sachs

5.65
4.19

Ministry of Finance

35.5

Allianz

1.9

Hui Jin

China Construction Bank
Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China

35.3
American Express
0.4
Source: Compiled by author from various annual reports of BOC, CCB and ICBC available from their web
pages.

Table 2: SWF Investments in Major Western Banks
Bank
SWF 1*
SWF 2*
Blackstone
CIC (9.9) (2)
Barclays
QIA (6.42) (12)
Temasek (2.6) (0)
Merill Lynch
Temasek (4.4)
KIA (2)
Morgan Stanley
CIC (9), (2)
UBS
GIC (9.7)

SWF 3*

Other*

CDB (3)
KIC (2)

Sheikh Mansour (16), (0)

Mitsubishi UFJ (20)
Saudi Arabian investor
(2)
Note: The size of the stake acquired in a single transaction is in parenthesis. Multiple entries indicate
subsequent changes CIC = China Investment Corporation; QIA = Qatar Investment Authority; CDB =
China Development Bank; KIA = Kuwait Investment Authority; KIC = Korean Investment Corporation.
Source: Various news reports compiled by the author.
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